The use of derivatives in a public sector setting by Brailsford, Tim et al.
The Use of Derivatives in a Public Sector Setting 
 
 
Tim Brailsford*, Richard Heaney** and Barry Oliver** 
 
* UQ Business School 
University of Queensland 
Brisbane 4072 Australia 
 
** School of Finance and Applied Statistics 
Australian National University 
ACT 0200 Australia 
 
Abstract 
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The Use of Derivatives in a Public Sector Setting 
 
 
1. Introduction 
The growth in financial derivative use over the past decade and a half has in part been 
attributed to the private sector with the common assumption that the derivative 
instruments are typically used in a financial risk management framework for firm 
value maximization and/or managerial utility maximization. Further, studies 
concerned with the motivation for derivatives use have focused almost exclusively on 
the private sector. This paper is among the first to focus on the use of derivatives in 
the public sector.  We rely on a principal-agent framework in explaining derivative 
use in Government entities. Given the inherent differences between the public and 
private sectors, the motivation for using derivatives and the attitude toward risk 
management are likely to differ between the two sectors.  
The level of derivative use is expected to be lower in public sector 
organizations.  Public sector organizations have an objective of providing a mission 
good as well as maximizing firm value (Erus and Weisbrod, 2002). This dual 
objective results in less incentive for management to maximize firm value relative to 
the private sector. Therefore, it is likely that there will be less derivative use by public 
sector organizations relative to private sector organization and that the motivations for 
derivative use will vary between the public and private sector.   
Managerial utility in public sector organizations is less aligned to firm value 
than for private sector organizations. We argue that managerial utility in the public 
sector is driven by budget discrepancies.  We develop a series of hypotheses 
concerning the use of derivatives in the public sector based around budget 
discrepancies and then conduct an empirical test using logistic regression over a 
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sample of 59 Australian Commonwealth government entities. The focus on the 
Australian public sector is important given its structure, devolved financial 
management principles, corporatisation policy, competitive neutrality policy, and the 
recent introduction of full accrual accounting systems.1  
While the Modigliani and Miller (1958) irrelevance theorem of corporate 
financial policy implies that the use of derivatives should not add to firm value in 
complete markets, the presence of market imperfections may explain the propensity of 
private sector firms to use derivatives. These market imperfection based arguments 
are generally based on the structure of private corporations and the environment 
within which they operate. Factors such as taxes, financial distress and agency costs 
become relevant as they are related to firm value and managerial utility. However, in 
the public sector, many of these factors are not relevant. For instance, public sector 
organisations rarely pay taxes or dividends and when they are applied, it is usually a 
means for government to claw-back cash surpluses that have been generated by the 
entity. Further, as governments both own and control public sector organisations, 
some of the traditional agency-based problems are unlikely to apply, although 
governments still have agents carrying out government objectives. Finally, 
governments tend to have “deep pockets” when it comes to supporting their own 
entities and hence arguments based on costly liquidation as an explanation for 
derivative use also appear to have little practical basis. This paper develops alternative 
arguments for the use of derivatives in the public sector that draw upon the motivation 
of the managers of government entities as well as principal-agent relationships.  
Managers of government entities generally do not face the same incentives as 
their counterparts in the private sector, yet the exposure arising from derivatives 
                                                 
1 The competitive neutrality policy essentially imposes a requirement on the public sector to compete 
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within the public sector in many countries can be substantial and similar to the private 
sector. Three widely cited examples of derivative losses in the UK, US and Australia 
highlight the magnitude of some government exposures.2 First, the London borough 
of Hammersmith and Fulham suffered large losses through swap transactions valued 
notionally at GBP6.2 billion between 1987 and 1989. Second, Orange County in the 
USA filed for bankruptcy protection in December 1994 after its investment fund lost 
US$2 billion arising from interest rate speculation based on positions in inverse 
floaters. Third, the Australian Commonwealth Treasury realised losses of over 
AUD$2 billion and reported further notional losses of over AUD$6 billion over the 
late 1990s relating to the use of interest rate swaps. 
The paper is organised as follows. An examination of the incentives for the 
use of derivatives in the public sector is explored in the next section.3 Section three 
develops the hypotheses. Section four discusses the construction of the sample that 
involves a data set based on accounting disclosures and survey findings. We note that 
only a comparatively small proportion of our sample of government entities (22%) 
use derivatives compared with the usage rates noted in the more recent private sector 
literature (greater than 50%).  Section five presents an empirical test of the hypotheses 
and the final section contains the conclusions. We also find that entity size and 
liabilities are important in explaining the probability of derivative use. To a lesser 
extent, there is also evidence that entities facing greater budget complexity or 
incurring taxes and dividends are also more likely to use derivatives.  
 
 
                                                                                                                                            
on equal terms as the private sector and not abuse its monopoly position. In practice, this translates to 
the charging of implicit taxes and rents and constrained fee setting. 
2 See Carew (1995) for a detailed discussion of derivative losses. 
3 An Appendix provides a brief overview of the Australian Commonwealth public sector environment. 
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2. Incentives for the Use of Derivatives 
The motivation for the use of derivatives in the private sector generally focuses on 
either hedging requirements in the context of maximising corporate value, or 
maximising risk-averse manager utility. The context of corporate value maximisation 
suggests that derivative use arises from convex tax schedules, agency costs, financial 
distress costs, transaction costs and investor diversification (Smith and Stulz 1985; 
Smith et al. 1990; Bessembinder 1991; Froot et al. 1993; Tufano 1996; Froot and 
Stein 1998; Cooper and Mello 1999; Rajgopal and Shevlin 2000). Alternatively, it has 
been proposed that managers use derivatives to maximise their own utility associated 
with over-investment problems and compensation packages (Smith and Stulz 1985; 
Cohen et al. 2000; Rajgopal and Shevlin 2000). 
Empirical tests of derivative use in the private sector have produced mixed 
results (Nance et al. 1993; Mian 1996; Tufano 1996; Geczy et al. 1997; Graham and 
Rogers 1999; Guay 1999; Hardwick and Adams 1999; Whidbee and Wohar 1999; 
Rajgopal and Shevlin 2000 and in Australia- Berkman et al. 2002 and Nguyen and 
Faff 2002). The range of empirical results may reflect the lack of a more general and 
unifying theory of derivative use in the complex setting of the modern corporation. 
Nevertheless, a common finding is that the use of derivatives is related to the size of 
the entity wherein larger firms tend to use derivatives. The typical explanation for this 
finding is that of economies of scale. Derivatives require some expert knowledge, an 
initial establishment cost, ongoing monitoring and usually involve minimum contract 
values. 
One of the benefits of conducting a study in the public sector is that there is a 
natural control for many of the complexities identified in the private sector. 
Government entities do not pay taxes or distribute dividends, at least not within the 
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framework in operation in the private sector. Central governments are regarded as the 
"lender of last resort" and hence financial distress issues are far less relevant in the 
public sector. Moreover, governments do not suffer from the equity agency cost 
problem that the private sector faces though there are important principal-agent 
relationships that exist within government, particularly between the higher levels of 
government and the managers of statutory authorities and corporations.4 Essentially, 
we argue that motivation for derivative use in government entities lies with the 
preference functions of the managers responsible for the entity.  One explanation for 
this observation is the requirement that government entities must meet the objectives 
of value maximisation and provision of a mission good.  This may also help to 
explain why derivative use is less evident in our government sector sample, compared 
with recent private sector derivative use literature.   
 
2.1 Motivation of Management 
The objective of value maximisation in a government entity is opaque given the lack 
of an observable value metric, such as a competitive share price. Moreover, 
government entities and service suppliers are explicit in their goals and these often do 
not include value maximisation. Issues of access, equity, efficiency and public good 
arguments are sometimes stated as primary objectives of these organisations. 
Particularly, Erus and Weisbrod (2002) consider non-profit organisations as producers 
of two goods- a mission good (M) that is socially desirable but privately unprofitable, 
and a revenue good (RG) that finances the provision of the mission good.  For 
example, the provision of telephone services in unprofitable locations.  The mission 
good is the provision of telephone services in unprofitable locations, such as in 
                                                 
4 These arguments are not complete. For instance, governments do go bankrupt, efficiency dividends 
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country areas. The revenue good is the provision of telephone services in profitable 
locations, such as in city areas.  From a private sector perspective a firm will not 
provide a mission good, but only a revenue good (RP).  If RG and RP have the same 
incentives M will not be produced.  Telephone services will not be provided in 
country areas by private sector firms.   Managers of private sector firms have the 
objective of maximizing the revenue good and hence firm value, whereas managers of 
public sector organisations must spread their effort across both the provision of the 
mission good and the revenue good.  That is, in our example, the public sector 
manager must provide telephone services in both the city and the country. If the 
motivation for derivative use in the private sector is to maximise firm value, but the 
maximisation of firm value is not the sole objective of the public sector, the 
motivations for the use of derivatives in the private sector derivative use may not 
adequately explain motivations for derivative use in the public sector.   
The Australian Commonwealth public service has undergone substantial 
change over the last decade and concepts such as shareholder value have become 
more relevant.5 Generally, the public sector has become more accountable with 
greater financial responsibility being placed on individual business units. Successive 
governments have embarked on policies of corporatisation and privatisation. Accrual 
accounting has been implemented across the sector. A consequence of these changes 
has been the devolution of financial delegation and budget accountability to the 
managers in charge of organisational units. In part, this has led to managers of 
                                                                                                                                            
are reaped from government entities and ultimately a government is accountable to the voting public. 
However, our argument is that these factors will be far less relevant in the public sector setting. 
5 From the early 1990s, the Commonwealth of Australia has been at the forefront of public sector 
reform. This has resulted in considerable change to the way the Commonwealth public service operates 
and in turn has affected the fabric of the Australian economic and financial systems. These reforms 
include the corporatisation and privatisation of many utilities, a new regulatory financial system and a 
new taxation system. The reforms have followed the recommendations of several inquiries including 
the National Commission of Audit (1996) and the Financial System Inquiry (1997). 
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government entities being regarded as, and expected to perform on a level, similar to 
their private sector counterparts. With the increased responsibility, more varied and 
complex compensation (and incentive) systems have been introduced. It is not 
uncommon for senior managers to receive incentive and performance-based 
compensation packages. These changes have also been commonplace in many other 
countries. 
The recent mimicking of the private sector particularly in relation to 
management structure and operation combined with the public goals of government 
have made it difficult to clearly identify the primary sources of management 
motivation in the public sector. It is inevitable that managers are subject to political 
pressure. Budget constraints also play a key role in management behaviour, as the 
ability to provide agreed levels of service within budget has become a prime objective 
and basis for performance targets.  
 
2.2 Management Utility 
Although proposed in the 1980s (Smith and Stulz 1985), it is not until recently that 
empirical studies have found support for the argument that management compensation 
could motivate the use of derivatives (Tufano 1996; Geczy et al. 1997; Cohen et al. 
2000; Rajgopal and Shevlin 2000). It is argued here that compensation, in a broad 
sense, may play a role in explaining derivative use within government entities. 
In this paper we assume that managers are risk averse and maximise their 
utility of wealth. Further, we assume that management compensation is (partially) a 
function of the budget, particularly budget discrepancies (income/allocation less 
expenditure). While managers would rarely plan for a budget discrepancy, there are 
two budget outcomes that can eventuate. First, expenditure can exceed allocation 
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(negative discrepancy). In such cases, although there may not be an immediate effect 
on remuneration, the impact on reputation and career of substantial budget overruns 
could include demotion, replacement and forced transfer. These are both feasible and 
costly to the manager. Second, allocation can exceed expenditure (positive 
discrepancy). In this case, the impact on the manager is not as clear. It is possible that 
under-spending could be seen as evidence of superior performance. However, positive 
budget discrepancies may depress future budget allocations with equally severe 
impact on longer-term expected remuneration to the manager.  
To focus on the motivation for derivative use in more detail, we develop the 
manager’s utility function from work traced back to Berle and Means (1932)6 and 
Mirrlees (1975) and Holmstrom (1979) amongst others.7  We write the manager’s 
utility function in state s as: 
 ( )[ ]sBDfWU −        (1) 
 where U[.]  = utility function with U’>0 and U’’<0 
  W   = salary and fixed benefits of employment not related to the state of 
  the world 
f(.) = budget discrepancy cost, increasing in the absolute value of the 
discrepancy.  
BDs  = [B – Es + Ds(Es – B)], the absolute value of the difference between 
the budget allocation and income from other sources (B), 
expenditure in state s (Es) and the derivative contract portfolio, 
paying Ds a function of (Es – B), in state s.   
 
Manager wealth in any state of the world is written as a concave function of 
salaries and fixed benefits as well as the net cost to the manager of budget 
discrepancies. In this model we assume that at the beginning of the period, managers 
know the budget allocation (B) but do not know the actual expenditure (Es) until the 
end of the period. The budget discrepancy could be viewed as a short forward contract 
with forward price equal to the budget allocation. To reduce the magnitude of budget 
                                                 
6 See Aggarwal and Samwick (1999). 
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discrepancies the manager could choose to have the entity hold a portfolio of 
derivative contracts whose value at the end of the budget period replicates the payoff 
from a long forward contract, thus reversing the impact of the budget discrepancy. At 
the end of the period the actual expenditure (Es) is known as well as the derivative 
contract portfolio payoff (Ds). Assume that the derivative payoff takes the form 
( )BED ss −=δ  with 10 ≤≤δ to allow for the possibility that managers may choose not 
to fully hedge the budget outcome. In effect the parameter δ is a hedge ratio. Equation 
(1) can be rewritten as: 
 
( )( )( )BEEBfWU ss −+−− δ  or ( )( )( )( )δ−−− 1sEBfWU    (2) 
 
Portfolios of derivative contracts can be constructed that help managers to manage 
risk factors such as foreign exchange rates and interest rates and so managers can use 
derivatives to decrease the magnitude of budget discrepancies. The use of derivatives 
in this way decreases the expected budget discrepancy costs to the manager and so 
increases the manager’s level of utility.  
We concentrate on the first-order conditions of a risk-averse manager, as 
modelled in equation (2), to analyse the propensity to use derivatives. Assuming that 
managers maximise expected utility then their utility maximisation problem can be 
written as:  
 ( )[ ]sS
s
s BDfWUpEU −=∑
=1
Max       (3) 
There are S states of the world (s = 1,…, S) and pi is the probability of state i 
occurring. We assume that a risk-averse manager will choose to maximise expected 
                                                                                                                                            
7 For a clear explanation of this work see Zhou (2002). 
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utility and thus minimise the impact of budget discrepancies because budget 
discrepancies, whether positive or negative, could adversely affect a manager’s 
wealth.  
We assume that the impact of budget discrepancies is symmetric and let the 
function, f, be a power function of order 2, ( )( )2sBDf π= , with π being a scaling 
factor. Utility is modelled using a constant relative risk aversion function of the form: 
( ) αα −−= 11
1 wwU        (4) 
where w = wealth 
α = constant relative risk aversion parameter and 1≠α  
 
We can write the manager’s problem as: 
 ( )( )( )[ ] αδπα −= −−−−=∑ 121 111Max  s
S
s
s EBWpEU    (5) 
The first-order condition with respect to the change in the derivative sensitivity to 
expenditure is: 
 
( )
( )[ ] ( ) ( )( )[ ]αα π δπππδ 2
2
1
2
1
122
s
s
S
s
s
s
ss
S
s
s
BDW
EBp
BDW
EBBDpEU
−
−−=
−
−=∂
∂ ∑∑
==
   (6) 
In equilibrium a manager will choose that level of derivative use that maximises 
expected utility. It is assumed that the manager’s final wealth [W-(BDs)2] is non-
negative in all states of the world, consistent with current bankruptcy laws. The 
impact of derivative use on manager utility is independent of the sign of the budget 
discrepancy though expected utility is increasing in the hedge ratio (δ). Further, the 
sensitivity of expected utility to changes in the hedge ratio (δ) is increasing in the 
wealth impact parameter (π). It is argued that derivative use is a function of the 
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expected magnitude of the budget discrepancy and the sensitivity of the manager’s 
utility of wealth to budget discrepancies.   
The level of hedging increases with increases in the level of costs to the 
manager arising from budget discrepancies. For example, the more visible the entity, 
the greater the cost in terms of tarnished reputation that the manager faces with budget 
discrepancies, and so the more likely the use of derivatives to avoid budget 
discrepancies. In essence, the more sensitive a manager’s personal wealth is to budget 
discrepancies the more likely the manager will choose to hedge. Factors that could 
affect sensitivity of manager wealth include size, where size captures costs such as 
political costs.   
We expect derivative use to occur where entities face a more complex or 
volatile environment. Thus entities with high salary concentration, considerable levels 
of budget complexity, greater levels of highly skilled staff, substantial liabilities and 
Government levied taxes and dividends are expected to be the most likely users of 
derivatives as these entities will tend to have greater difficulty in managing their 
budget. The likelihood of budget discrepancies could also be captured using measures 
such as the variance in budget discrepancies before the impact of derivatives. Finally, 
although size will tend to capture political costs, it will also capture economies of 
scale such that only the larger entities will tend to use derivatives.   
We argue that risk averse managers use derivatives to avoid budget 
discrepancies where economically feasible, and that the level of hedging is related to 
the cost to managers of budget discrepancies.   
 
3. Hypotheses 
3.1 Management of Cash Holdings 
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If managers choose to control the risk of budget discrepancies, they can do so in a 
number of ways. Superior negotiation skills could allow them to build slack into the 
current budget allocation and thus minimise the possibility of budget discrepancies 
occurring in the future. However, there are reputation effects from such a strategy that 
could adversely affect future budget negotiations. Nevertheless, such a strategy may 
work in the short-term while its longer-term effectiveness is dependent on the ability 
of more senior staff, perhaps at the ministerial level, to access and understand 
financial reports.  
It is difficult to measure the ability of an entity to build up slack, particularly 
when relying on external reports. However, one measure of slack is the level of net 
cash equivalents (cash, marketable securities and current receivables less current 
liabilities) on hand at year-end. If an entity has surplus cash, then the need to manage 
cash flows is reduced. Managers may have control over the level of liquid assets, and 
some of the liabilities. If an entity can build up and control cash balances then the 
entity may reduce the probability of negative budget discrepancies in the future and 
thus reduce the need for derivatives. As a measure of expected slack at the end of the 
period, we employ the prior period year-end slack. This leads to our first hypothesis:  
H1: Prior period cash holdings, as measured by net cash equivalents as a 
percentage of total assets for the previous period, is negatively related to the use of 
derivatives. 
 
3.2 Budget Discrepancy History 
From the above, risk-averse managers will tend to avoid budget discrepancies due to 
the impact on utility. Given this argument it is expected that derivative use will be 
positively related to the volatility of the budget discrepancy (before hedging). That is, 
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the more volatile the budget discrepancy, the greater the benefits from derivative use. 
The volatility of the current budget discrepancy is difficult to measure. However, past 
volatility is likely to be related to current volatility, and past volatility has often been 
used in the literature in similar contexts (eg. Bradley et al. 1984). A further 
complication arises because it is not possible to identify the volatility of the budget 
discrepancy before hedging.  
The variable used to capture budget discrepancy history is the standard 
deviation of the percentage change in cash inflows calculated over a five-year period. 
This choice is based on the assumption that changes in total cash inflow will tend to 
capture a major source of budget discrepancy and are clearly related to the variation in 
budget discrepancy.8 This leads to our second hypothesis: 
H2: The volatility of budget discrepancy, as measured by the standard deviation of 
past cash inflows, is positively related to the use of derivatives. 
 
3.3 Salary Level Concentration 
The magnitude of payroll may affect derivative use. It is reasonable to assume that the 
salary level is positively related with manager’s level of responsibility. As the salary 
rises, so the costs of budget discrepancies increase. In comparison with the private 
sector, salary scales are fairly rigid in the Commonwealth public service. However, 
budget discrepancies will undoubtedly have an impact on the more senior, better-paid 
managers. Moreover, it could be argued that the greater the relative proportion of such 
staff in an entity, the greater the chance of budget discrepancies and so the greater the 
incentive for the senior managers to use derivatives. Hence, derivative use will be an 
increasing function of the concentration of higher ranked and more highly paid staff. 
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The variable used to measure this effect is the sum of payments made to the board of 
directors, the executive and the senior officers as disclosed in the annual report scaled 
by total employee expenses plus payments to the directors, the executive and 
managers. This leads to our third hypothesis: 
H3: The concentration of senior manager salaries is positively related to the use of 
derivatives. 
 
 
 
3.4 Budget Complexity 
In a complex setting, organisations may find that derivatives provide a flexible 
method of handling the variability of cash. In the private sector, such a factor may 
relate to the diversity of products, intensity of research and development, and scope of 
operations. However, in the public sector, budget complexity relates to two broad 
elements – the budget allocation and other income derived from commercial 
activities. The budget allocation is fixed, usually at the start of the period whereas 
other income is volatile. In settings where other income represents a relatively large 
proportion of the total income available, the management of cash and the budget is 
more complex. In such situations there is an incentive to use derivatives to smooth the 
budget outcome. We use the ratio of other income to total income for the period as a 
measure of budget complexity. This leads to our fourth hypothesis: 
H4: Budget complexity is positively related to the use of derivatives. 
 
3.5 Economies of Scale and Political Costs  
                                                                                                                                            
8 However, we note that this is an imperfect measure and will be more so in periods where derivatives 
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Arguments for economies of scale are well known in the literature (Smith and Stulz 
1985; Nance et al. 1993; Mian 1996). Economies of scale may work to restrict the use 
of derivatives by smaller government entities due to the large nominal amounts 
involved in most derivative contracts (Smith and Stulz 1985; Nance et al. 1993). 
Further, the use of derivatives involves initial set-up costs, ongoing consulting costs, 
expert staff and costs of monitoring and operating (dynamic) hedging strategies. 
Moreover, larger entities are more visible and face greater political costs associated 
with budget discrepancies that ultimately impact on manager utility. Thus it is 
expected that derivative use will vary positively with entity size. The proxy for size 
used in empirical studies is the natural log of (book value) total assets. This leads to 
our fifth hypothesis: 
H5: The size of an entity, as measured by total assets, is positively related to the 
use of derivatives. 
 
3.6  Liabilities 
Where an entity uses liability financing, the importance of short-term cash control 
becomes more critical and derivatives provide a means for the management of cash. 
This is not a financial distress story, but rather one of the management of the short-
term budget and the implications of budget discrepancies on managers. As noted 
earlier, financial distress is unlikely to be a significant factor in government entities, 
at least in the short-term. It is expected that there will be a positive relationship 
between the level of liabilities and the level of derivative use. The ratio of the book 
value of liabilities to the book value of total assets is used to proxy cash flow 
management problems arising from liabilities. This leads to our sixth hypothesis: 
                                                                                                                                            
generate cash. 
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H6: The level of liability financing is positively related to the use of derivatives. 
 
3.7 Taxes and Dividends 
Finally, there is also the additional cash flow complication that some entities face with 
central government levies such as implied taxes and efficiency dividends based on 
perceptions of efficiency and driven by the perceived need for government to relieve 
entities of excess cash. This factor provides managers with a further incentive to 
manage their cash flows. Thus, it is expected that there is a positive relation between 
the incidence of tax and dividend levies and the use of derivatives. Taxes and 
dividends are scaled by total cash inflows. This leads to our final hypothesis: 
H7: The level of implied taxes and dividends is positively related to the use of 
derivatives. 
 
The hypotheses and variable definitions are summarised in Table 1. 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
 
4. Data 
The sample is drawn from the population of Commonwealth government entities 
identified in the Commonwealth Consolidated Annual Report for the year ended 30 
June 1999.9 This report identifies 180 entities that consist of 80 statutory authorities, 
16 companies and 84 entities that fall under the FMA Act. The study focuses on the 
derivative use by those entities covered by the CAC Act as these entities most closely 
resemble private sector organisations. Consequently, the 84 entities falling under the 
FMA Act are excluded from the study. This leaves 96 statutory authorities and 
                                                 
9 This was obtained from the Commonwealth Department of Finance and Administration.  
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corporations in the sample which is the population of potential derivative users in the 
Australian public service. A questionnaire was distributed to all entities to study the 
risk management practices of Commonwealth government entities.10 The response 
rate to the survey resulted in 61 usable responses representing a response rate of 
64%.11,12 
 
Accounting information from annual reports was obtained for all entities. Each 
annual report was inspected for evidence of disclosure of derivative holdings or 
trading activity. Of the 96 eligible entities, 13 (or 14%) were identified as derivative 
users. Consistent with the annual report disclosures, the same 13 derivative users were 
self-identified from the survey representing a response rate from derivative users of 
100%. Hence, the survey responses confirm the reported accounting information. 
Moreover, this confirmatory evidence supports the validity of the respondents. There 
were 48 usable survey responses among the derivative non-users. No accounting 
information was available for the year-end 2000 for two (non-user) organisations. 
Hence, the final sample size is 59 entities, including all derivative users and 55% of 
derivative non-users.  
As noted above, the level of derivative use in the public sector sample (22%) 
is considerably less than that evident in private sector. In two Australian studies, 
Berkman et al. (2002) who use a small sample of Australian private sector firms 
sampled over the 1990s and Nguyen and Faff (2002) who use a sample of large 
                                                 
10 The survey was conducted in February 2000 addressed to the Chief Executive Officer or Chief 
Finance Officer of each organisation in the sample with a self-addressed return envelope. Follow-up 
telephone conversations with a sample of organisations, as well as reply letters included with 
responses, indicated that either a CEO or CFO completed the surveys as requested. 
11 Sixty-three responses were received but two were deleted, as identification of the organisation was 
impossible. Both observations were from derivative non-users. Not all respondents provided answers to 
all questions. 
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Australian private sector firms from 1999 and 2000, report derivative use rates 
exceeding 50% and 70% respectively.  It is clear that government sector derivative 
use is less common than private sector derivative use as argued above.  Table 2 
provides a detailed breakdown of the sample. 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
 
The explanatory variable descriptive statistics are reported in Panel A of Table 
3. There is some non-normality in the variables SLK, TAX and VOL with median 
values less than their means and large skewness and kurtosis estimates. The variable 
SLK has a mean of 35%, indicating a strong liquidity position for the sample though 
the standard deviation of 216% suggests substantial variation across the sample. TAX 
has a mean of 0.5% implying that “efficiency dividends” are infrequent across the 
sample. This variable generally takes a value of zero. VOL is particularly affected by 
a small group of entities that have seen dramatic change over the period from 1996 to 
2000. This accounts for the difference between the average value of 116% per annum 
and the median value of 18% per annum.  
Of the other variables, EXC, averages 18.3% with standard deviation of 
23.3%. TOT averages 10.7 with standard deviation of 2.5. The importance of 
commercial income for the entities is apparent given the CPX average of 31.5%. 
Liabilities are apparent with LIAB averaging 36.0% of the book value of assets.13 
                                                                                                                                            
12 Non-response bias was considered by sorting the responses from non-users according to the date they 
were received. t-tests on the mean scores for the first 10 (20) and last 10 (20) responses received could 
not reject the null of equal means.  
13 The extreme values for SLK, VOL and TAX require some comment. The minimum value for SLK of 
–7.487 is attributable to the Reserve Bank of Australia and arises from the definition of liquid assets 
including only cash, marketable securities and account receivable along with the relatively low levels 
of operating cash received. If we were to use the current ratio, the SLK value would be positive and 
very small for this entity. The maximum value of SLK of 12.709 is attributable to the Stevedoring 
Industry Finance Committee that had few liabilities and relatively low levels of operating cash 
received. The VOL maximum of 3,457% is attributable to the Indigenous Land Corporation that saw 
phenomenal growth over the period of the study. Dropping this one variable results in a reduction of 
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Panel B of Table 3 presents the correlation matrix for the variables described 
in Table 1. There are statistically significant correlations between size (TOT) and 
three variables, TAX, EXC and CPX. That is, larger entities tend to pay more taxes 
and dividends, have lower percentages of senior executive salaries and generate 
greater relative levels of non-government revenue. Further, there is a positive 
correlation between non-government income and the level of tax and dividend 
payments consistent with the more commercial nature of the entities that pay taxes 
and dividends. Similarly, tax and dividend payments are related to the level of 
liabilities. Financial slack in the previous period is also positively correlated with 
executive salary concentration suggesting the entities with relatively high proportions 
of senior management tend to hold greater levels of cash.  
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
 
5. Analysis 
The dependent variable, derivative use, identifies whether the organisation uses or 
does not use derivatives in the year 2000. As noted above, the classification of the 
organisations is made with a high degree of confidence as we are able to cross check 
financial report disclosure against survey information. The derivative use variable is 
dichotomous and so logit analysis is applied. The logit model takes the form: 
( ) ( ) ( )( )β+
β=βΛ==
i
i
ii Xexp1
XexpX1yProb        
where ( )1yProb i =   = the probability that the entity uses derivatives  
Xi   = matrix of explanatory variables 
                                                                                                                                            
the average from 115.7% to 58%. Three other entities, Medibank Private (510%), Export Finance 
Insurance Corporation (429%) and Australian Dairy Corporation (904%), accounted for the remainder 
of the extremely volatile operating cash receipt observations. With the removal of these four entities 
the average volatility falls to 28% across the remainder of the sample. To reduce the impact of these 
large values the natural log of volatility was used in regressions but this transformation had little 
impact on the final results. Finally, the larger entities with substantial non-government revenue tend to 
report tax and dividends values (TAX). Most entities have a zero value for this variable.  
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 β   = vector of estimated parameters  
 
The full model including all variables, takes the form:  
iiiiiiii TAXLIABTOTCPXEXCVOLSLKX 76543210 ααααααααβ +++++++=   
(7) 
 
where  SLK  = the ratio of net cash equivalents (sum of cash, accounts receivable 
and marketable securities less current liabilities) over operating cash 
received in the immediate past period,  
 VOL  = the standard deviation of the percentage change in operating cash 
received over the period 1996 to 2000 inclusive,  
 EXC  = the sum of payments made to directors, executives and officers 
scaled by total employee expenses,  
 CPX  = ratio of non-government income to total income,  
 TOT  = the natural log of book value of total assets and,  
 LIAB  = book value of liabilities scaled by book value of total assets, and 
 TAX  = implied tax charges plus (efficiency) dividends scaled by operating 
cash received.  
    
Table 4 reports the results of the logit analysis for both the full model and 
restricted models. In Panel A we report the full model and a series of univariate 
regressions. In Panel B we assess the impact of the multicollinearity by excluding size 
(TOT) and other correlated variables. In both panels, two t-statistics are reported 
based on the traditional Logit standard errors and on bootstrap standard errors.  
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
 
First, focus on the full model in Table 4, Panel A and the Logit standard 
errors. The two statistically significant variables are TOT and LIAB.14 The regression 
is statistically significant with a McFadden R-square value of 0.46. The positive sign 
on TOT indicates that larger entities are more likely to use derivatives. This finding is 
consistent with the corporate sector (Smith and Stulz 1985; Nance et al. 1993; Mian 
                                                 
14 There are two large entities whose core business is financial. The Reserve Bank of Australia and the 
Export Finance Insurance Corporation. The full model was also run excluding these entities with little 
impact on the regression results. 
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1996). It would appear that the economies of scale and political costs arguments carry 
some weight in the public sector. The positive sign on LIAB suggests that the greater 
the level of liabilities the more likely derivative use will occur. With greater levels of 
liabilities it is necessary to manage cash flows more carefully and so there is greater 
incentive to use derivatives. This finding is consistent with evidence from the 
corporate area. However, the motivation for derivative use in the public sector is in 
terms of cash flow management rather than financial distress. The remaining 
coefficients are not statistically significant in the full regression. However, the signs 
on the coefficients are generally consistent with the hypotheses.  
In the univariate regressions, the McFadden R-square statistics vary 
considerably from 0.00 to 0.34. The univariate regressions that include the variables 
CPX, TOT, LIAB and TAX are statistically significant. All of these significant 
coefficients are consistent in sign with the hypotheses. That is, budget complexity, 
entity size, the level of liabilities and the presence of taxes are all positively related to 
the probability of derivative use. Further, SLK, although not statistically significant, 
has a negative sign consistent with the argument that derivative use is less likely if the 
entity has sufficient cash reserves to provide a buffer for contingencies.  
Given the significant correlation between TOT, CPX, EXC and TAX we 
repeat the analysis in Table 4, Panel B, but selectively exclude these variables. The 
size variable (TOT) is excluded from all the regressions. In the first regression only 
the size variable is excluded to identify the impact of this variable. The only 
statistically significant coefficient remaining in the regression is for the LIAB variable 
and the McFadden R-square falls from 0.46 to 0.23. The results are consistent with 
Panel A suggesting that these two variables, TOT and LIAB, capture different 
motivations for derivative use. When both TOT and LIAB are dropped from the 
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regression, the model is no longer statistically significant. In the third regression, the 
TOT and TAX variables are dropped and both CPX and LIAB coefficients are now 
statistically significant. These variations in the results are not unexpected given the 
correlations reported in Table 3 and the two univariate regressions reported in Table 
4, Panel A.  
The results reported so far are based on the fitting of a logistic regression to a 
sample of 59 observations, albeit that this sample size is close to the population. In 
order to overcome deficiencies of a small sample, we use the bootstrap technique to 
re-estimate the standard errors. This technique involves the generation of a 
distribution of parameter values based on 10,000 iterations of the Logit analysis over 
resampled data. The bootstrap parameter distribution is used to generate standard 
errors used in calculation of t-statistics and these bootstrap adjusted t-statistics are 
reported in brackets below the standard Logit t-statistics.  The main result from the 
bootstrap analysis in Table 4 is the confirmation of the importance of the level of 
liabilities, and to some extent size, in explaining derivative use. Of note the CPX and 
TAX parameters are not statistically significant in any of the regressions where the 
bootstrap method is used in estimation of the standard errors. Size is also less 
consistent as an explanation of derivative use with statistical significance only evident 
in the univariate regression in Table 4, Panel A. In Table 5, Panel B the significance 
of the parameter estimates are not affected by inclusion or exclusion of TOT, LIAB or 
TAX, and only the level of liabilities is significant at the 10% level.  
As argued earlier, it is not expected that value maximising incentives generally 
applicable to the corporate sector will also explain derivative use in the public sector. 
The important finding in this paper is that size and the level of liabilities are 
determinants of derivative use by government entities, albeit the significance of the 
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size variable is dependent on the estimation method of the standard errors. These 
variables are often associated with transaction costs and cash management issues yet 
the traditional literature (Smith and Stulz 1985; Bessembinder 1991) says little about 
these motivations. We argue that, in the public sector, a reticence for budget 
discrepancies may drive management derivative use.   
 
6. Conclusions 
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The question of the motivation for derivatives use is complex. This study is the first to 
examine derivative use in the public sector. In the main, this is an exploratory paper 
that presents a framework and base for future research. We observe that the 
proportion of public sector organisations using derivatives in our sample (22%) is 
considerably less than evident in studies of Australian private sector derivative use 
(>50%).  We also observe that the reasons advanced for the use of derivatives in the 
private sector do not readily apply to the public sector. For instance, there is little 
reason to expect government entities to focus on wealth maximisation as their prime 
objective or to be overly concerned with financial distress costs. In addition to 
maximizing value, maximizing managerial utility is often cited as a reason for 
derivative use in the private sector. Thus in the more complex setting, where 
managers must attain multiple goals including value maximisation and the provision 
of mission goods, we argue that management utility will be important in determining 
derivative use in these organisations.  We argue that management utility will be a 
function of budgets and budget discrepancies. From this it is argued that managers 
will use derivatives to maximise utility by avoiding budget discrepancies. A series of 
hypotheses is developed surrounding this argument. 
The hypotheses are tested on a sample of Australian Commonwealth 
government entities. The sample of Australian entities is chosen because of the 
advanced public sector setting and its structure, devolved financial management 
principles, corporatisation policy, competitive neutrality policy and the recent 
introduction of full accrual accounting systems.  The results of statistical tests suggest 
that derivative use is most likely to occur in larger entities consistent with the 
existence of economies of scale and political costs. Larger entities are better able to 
absorb the costs of derivative use and the managers in larger entities are also sensitive 
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to greater political costs. Further, the strongest result is that the greater the level of 
liabilities, the greater the probability of derivative use. The introduction of liabilities 
to these entities creates a responsibility to pay interest and this leverage increases the 
likelihood of budget discrepancies and the complexity of the budgeting process. These 
results are consistent with the argument that utility maximising managers use 
derivatives for budget management. There is also some evidence that entities that pay 
taxes and/or dividends or those that earn greater levels of non-government revenue 
tend to use derivatives more than their counterparts which also supports the argument 
that the more complex the management of the budget, the greater the propensity for 
derivatives use.  
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Appendix 
 
The Australian Commonwealth Public Sector Environment 
The system of Commonwealth government in Australia is based on the Westminster 
tradition with two houses, the House of Representatives and the Senate.  Members of 
Parliament are elected at least once every three years. The Prime Minister and other 
Ministers are appointed from the political parties that control a majority of seats in the 
House of Representatives.15 The governing Ministers are assigned specific portfolio 
responsibilities. There are currently 19 ministerial portfolios.16  
Within each portfolio there are typically many smaller and sometimes separate 
organisations, that effectively operate as business units. These organisations comprise 
three types - (1) Commonwealth-owned companies, governed under the Australian 
Corporations Act; (2) Commonwealth authorities, governed under individual enabling 
legislation (i.e. their own Acts of the Commonwealth Parliament); and (3) 
organisations without any separate legal power who derive their power from the 
power vested in their Commonwealth Departments through various statutes (which in 
some cases may be Acts of the Commonwealth Parliament specific to the 
organisation). This final group of organisations are not legally separate from the 
Commonwealth and have limited contractual powers. For example, they do not have 
the power to borrow.17 
Commonwealth authorities and companies (irrespective of whether they are 
governed by the Corporations Law or their own enabling legislation) are also bound 
                                                 
15 Legislation must pass through two houses. The House of Representatives is where the governing 
body resides and legislation generally first passes through the House of representatives before being 
reviewed by the Senate. 
16 The precise number of portfolios is a function of the elected government in power.  
17 Oliver (1999) presents a discussion on the legal powers of Commonwealth entities and provides 
commentary on their powers to enter into derivative contracts. 
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by the Commonwealth Authorities and Companies Act 1997 (CAC Act). The CAC 
Act regulates certain aspects of the financial affairs of Commonwealth authorities. In 
particular, the Act includes detailed rules for financial reporting, accountability 
measures and covers other financial matters such as banking, investment and the 
conduct of managers. For Commonwealth-owned companies, the CAC Act sets out 
reporting requirements and other requirements that apply in addition to the generic 
requirements of the Corporations Law.  
Organisations that are not legally separate from the Commonwealth are bound 
by the legislation authorising their establishment and the Financial Management and 
Accountability Act 1997. The main purpose of this Act is to provide a framework for 
the management of public money and property. This study focuses on those 
organisations governed by the CAC Act, excluding those covered by the FMA Act 
given the limited autonomy of these latter entities.  
In brief, the use of derivatives by Australian Commonwealth government 
entities is governed both by the law and the underlying nature of the entities. In some 
instances, entities have been initially barred from using derivatives yet managers 
within the entity have been successful in having the enabling legislation altered to 
allow the use of derivatives. Thus although legal impediments may exist to prevent 
the use of derivatives, they need not represent a permanent block to the use of 
derivatives.  
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Table 1 
Hypotheses and Variable Definitions 
 
This table details the hypotheses, the expected relationship with derivative use, the variable and how it 
is measured.  
 
Hypothesis (expected sign) 
 
Variable 
 
Proxy 
 
H1 Management of cash 
holdings (-) 
SLK Ratio of net cash equivalents (sum of cash, 
accounts receivable and marketable securities 
less current liabilities) over operating cash 
received in the immediate past period 
 
H2 Volatility of budget 
discrepancy (+) 
VOL Standard deviation of percentage change in the 
operating cash received over the period 1996 to 
2000 inclusive  
H3 Salary level 
concentration (+) 
EXC Concentration of executive salaries measured 
using the sum of payments made to directors, 
executives and officers scaled by total 
employee expenses 
H4 Budget complexity (+) CPX 
 
Non-government income scaled by total income 
H5 Economies of scale (+) TOT Size is measured using natural log of book 
value of total assets  
 
H6 Liability management 
(+) 
LIAB Book value of liabilities scaled by book value 
of total assets 
 
H7 Taxes and dividends 
(+) 
TAX Implied tax charges plus (efficiency) dividends 
scaled by operating cash received 
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Table 2 
Sample of Organisations of the Commonwealth of Australia 
 
This table details the composition of the sample of organisations used in the analysis (n=59). It 
commences with the population of government organisations (n=180) identified from the 
Commonwealth Consolidated Annual Report for the year ended 30 June 1999 and then indicates why 
some organisations are excluded from the analysis. 
 
Type of organisation 
 
Number 
The total number of Commonwealth organisation included in the 
Commonwealth Consolidated Annual Report for the year ended 30 June 1999 
180 
Less  
FMA organisations (these are organisations that are not separate legal entities of 
the Commonwealth and are governed wholly or in part under the FMA Act 
(1997)) 
 
84 
 
Possible derivative users consisting of: 
 
 
96 
Commonwealth companies (these are organisations that have separate legal 
status and are governed under Corporations Law and the CAC Act (1997)) 
16 
Commonwealth statutory authorities (these are organisations that have separate 
legal status and are governed by their own enabling legislation and the CAC Act 
(1997)) 
80 
 
Possible derivative users 
 
 
96 
Less  
Non-response or inadequately completed questionnaire 
 
35 
 
Validly completed questionnaires 
 
 
61 
Less  
No accounting information 
 
2 
 
Final sample used in the study, consisting of: 
 
 
59 
Commonwealth companies (these are organisations that have separate legal 
status and are governed under Corporations Law and the CAC Act (1997)) 
4 
Commonwealth statutory authorities (these are organisations that have separate 
legal status and are governed by their own enabling legislation and the CAC Act 
(1997)) 
55 
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Table 3 
Explanatory Variables 
 
This table reports descriptive statistics and the correlation matrix of explanatory variables. SLK - the 
ratio of net cash equivalents (sum of cash, accounts receivable and marketable securities less current 
liabilities) over operating cash received in the immediate past period; VOL - the standard deviation of 
the percentage change in operating cash received over the period 1996 to 2000 inclusive; EXC - the 
sum of payments made to directors, executives and officers scaled by total employee expenses; CPX - 
the ratio of non-government income to total income; TOT - the natural log of book value of total assets; 
LIAB - the book value of liabilities scaled by book value of total assets; TAX - implied tax charges 
plus (efficiency) dividends scaled by operating cash received. 
 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics of Explanatory Variables 
 
Variables Mean Median Max. Min. Std. Dev. Skewness Kurtosis 
CPX 0.315 0.176 1.000 0.006 0.344 1.159 2.810 
LIAB 0.360 0.297 1.098 0.001 0.315 0.758 2.486 
EXC 0.183 0.082 1.000 0.000 0.233 1.985 6.512 
SLK 0.352 0.023 12.709 -7.487 2.163 2.837 22.717 
TAX 0.005 0.000 0.094 0.000 0.020 3.598 14.371 
TOT 10.697 10.167 17.835 6.262 2.456 0.530 2.831 
VOL 1.157 0.183 34.570 0.015 4.647 6.556 47.033 
 
 
 
Panel B: Correlation Matrix of Explanatory Variables 
 
 CPX LIAB EXC SLK TAX TOT VOL 
CPX 1.000       
LIAB 0.090 1.000      
EXC 0.012 -0.002 1.000     
SLK 0.086 -0.058 0.271* 1.000    
TAX 0.499* 0.249* -0.109 0.107 1.000   
TOT 0.292* 0.106 -0.252* -0.132 0.307* 1.000  
VOL -0.023 -0.055 0.134 0.007 -0.006 0.140 1.000 
 
* Statistically significant at the 5% level of significance.  
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Table 4 
Analysis of Derivative Use 
 
Results of logistic regression analysis of the derivative use question are reported in this table. The 
derivative use dummy variable is regressed on the variables: SLK - the ratio of net cash equivalents 
(sum of cash, accounts receivable and marketable securities less current liabilities) over operating cash 
received in the immediate past period; VOL - the standard deviation of the percentage change in 
operating cash received over the period 1996 to 2000 inclusive; EXC - the sum of payments made to 
directors, executives and officers scaled by total employee expenses; CPX - the ratio of non-
government income to total income; TOT - the natural log of book value of total assets; LIAB - the 
book value of liabilities scaled by book value of total assets; TAX - implied tax charges plus 
(efficiency) dividends scaled by operating cash received. Logit is used for estimation. 
( ) ( ) ( )( )β+
β=βΛ==
i
i
ii Xexp1
XexpX1yProb  
 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7i i i i i i i iX SLK VOL EXC CPX TOT LIAB TAXβ α α α α α α α α= + + + + + + +  
 
Prob(yi=1) is the probability that the company uses derivatives, Xi is a matrix of explanatory variables, 
β is a vector of estimated parameters. The full regression is run over 59 observations.  
 
Due to the problems associated with the application of Logit to small sample sizes, alternative standard 
error estimates were obtained through bootstrapping. There were 10,000 iterations conducted for each 
model. This technique involves re-sampling cases and repeating the Logit analysis on this resampled 
datat. The estimated parameters were saved and at the end of the 10,000 iterations the standard error 
was calculated for each parameter using the distribution of parameter estimates. The technique is 
further discussed in Lunneborg (2000) and Johnston and DiNardo (1997).  
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Panel A – Full Model and Univariate Models 
There are eight regressions run. The first regression includes all variables and the remaining seven 
regressions are simple regressions with the dependent variable regressed on one of the explanatory 
variables. 
  
C -11.95 -1.23 -1.29 -1.07 -1.98 -10.01 -2.34 -1.52 
 (-3.54*) (-3.89*) (-3.97*) (-2.68*) (-4.02*) (-3.78*) (-3.93*) (-4.33*)
 [-4.32*] [-3.60*] [-3.35*] [-2.43*] [-4.23*] [6.21*] [-4.43*] [-4.46*]
SLK -0.65 -0.20       
 (-1.50) (-0.96)       
 [-0.69] [-0.27]       
VOL -0.00  0.02      
 (-0.03)  (0.36)      
 [-0.00]  [0.02]      
EXC 0.70   -1.19     
 (0.29)   (-0.73)     
 [0.11]   [-0.54]     
CPX -0.28    1.92    
 (-0.14)    (2.22*)    
 [-0.16]    [1.52]    
TOT 0.82     0.75   
 (3.07*)     (3.51*)   
 [0.37]     [5.05*]   
LIAB 3.03      2.53  
 (1.95*)      (2.46*)  
 [14.76*]      [2.11*]  
TAX 27.80       37.67 
 (0.80)       (2.17*)
 [0.10]       [0.14]
         
LR statistic (7 df) 28.91 1.18 0.12 0.61 4.98 21.39 6.55 6.41 
Probability (LR stat) 0.00* 0.28 0.73 0.44 0.03* 0.00* 0.01* 0.01*
McFadden R-squared 0.46 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.08 0.34 0.11 0.10 
Obs with Dep=0 46        
Obs with Dep=1 13        
Total obs 59        
 
* significant at the 5% level, + significant at the 10% level, terms in parentheses are Logit t-statistics 
and terms in brackets are Logit based bootstrap t-statistics.  
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Panel B – Restricted Full Models 
 
There are three regressions reported in this panel. The first includes all the variables excluding the size 
(TOT) variable. The second consists of all variables except for size (TOT) and liabilities (LIAB). The 
final of the three regressions consists of all the variables excluding size (TOT) and tax and dividends 
(TAX).  
 
C -2.68 -1.76 -2.94 
 (-3.37*) (-3.06*) (-3.74*) 
 [-3.15*] [-2.64*] [-3.60*] 
SLK -0.23 -0.26 -0.14 
 (-0.87) (-1.08) (-0.64) 
 [-0.23] [-0.30] [-0.17] 
VOL 0.05 0.03 0.06 
 (0.78) (0.52) (0.88) 
 [0.04] [0.03] [0.05] 
EXC -1.14 -0.41 -1.61 
 (-0.63) (-0.25) (-0.90) 
 [-0.42] [-0.15] [-0.60] 
CPX 1.22 0.96 2.03 
 (0.94) (0.83) (2.07*) 
 [0.79] [0.65] [1.32] 
LIAB 2.35  2.70 
 (2.02*)  (2.40*) 
 [1.64]  [1.89+] 
TAX 22.94 35.79  
 (0.98) (1.51)  
 [0.09] [0.13]  
    
LR statistic (6 df) 14.11 9.85 12.98 
Probability (LR stat) 0.03* 0.08 0.02* 
McFadden R-squared 0.23 0.16 0.21 
Obs with Dep=0 46   
Obs with Dep=1 13   
Total obs 59   
 
* significant at the 5% level, + significant at the 10% level, terms in parentheses are Logit t-statistics 
and terms in brackets are Logit based bootstrap t-statistics.  
